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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010211-CA

vs.
DANIAL PETERSON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals an order dismissing the information charging defendant with
possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), failure to respond to an officer's signal
to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1999),
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37a-5(2) (1998), and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3)(a) (1998). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the charges against defendant for failure to

bring the case to trial within 120 days of defendant's disposition request, where the
1

proceedings were delayed 91 days because of defendant's motion to suppress and his motion
to reconsider the court's denial of the motion to suppress?
Standard of Review. "[T]he trial court's factual determinations will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous." State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1991), However, the
court's "legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which grants
the trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness." Id.
2.

Alternatively, did the trial court commit plain error when it dismissed all four

charges pending against defendant under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), where he
identified only one charge in his request for disposition?
Standard of Review. This claim involves interpretation of a statute and, thus, presents
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, f 11, 997
P.2d 314, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
App. 1997). Because the State did not object to the dismissal of all four charges before the
trial court, this Court will review the claim for plain error. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT
45, f56, 979 P.2d 799. Plain error exists where an error occurs which is obvious and
substantially prejudicial. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), set forth below, is relevant
to a determination of this case:

2

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment
of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
On June 2, 2000. defendant was arrested for (1) possession of a controlled substance
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony; (2) failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; and
(4) driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor. R. 04. After the State filed an
information formally charging defendant, he requested a preliminary hearing. R. 01-02,09.
l

The underlying facts which are alleged to support the charges against defendant
are not necessary to a determination of this appeal and are therefore not set forth herein.
3

On July 7, 2000. the court held a preliminary hearing and bound defendant over for
trial on all four counts. R. 16, 153. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, defense
counsel advised the court of his intent to file pretrial motions, presumably dispositive of the
case. See R. 153: 33-35. The trial court established a motion schedule, setting oral argument
for August 21, 2000. SeeR. 17-18; R. 153:33-36.
On July 10. 2000. defendant prepared and signed a request for disposition of pending
charges, delivering it to Lieutenant Scott Carter of the Utah County Jail. R. 88-90. The
disposition request identified a pending charge for possession of methamphetamine in Fourth
District Court, Case No. 001400283. R. 90. Although the district court apparently received
a copy of the disposition request, which bore a case number different than the case here, it
was never placed in the court file. See R. 147. The prosecutor had no record of ever
receiving a copy of the disposition request. R. 159: 3-4.
On August 21. 2000. the trial court heard oral argument on defendant's suppression
motion. R. 40-41; see also R. 31-34. The trial court denied defendant's motion and
scheduled a pretrial conference for the purpose of setting a trial date. See R. 40-41; R. 155:
3.
On September 8. 2000. the court held the scheduled pretrial conference. R. 57-58,
155. There, defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider, asking the court to reconsider its ruling
denying the motion to suppress. R. 47-55, 155. Rather than setting a trial date, the court
continued the pretrial conference, reasoning that a trial would not be necessary if upon
reconsideration, it granted defendant's motion to suppress. See R. 155: 3-6.
4

On September 29. 2000. the court advised the parties that it still had not ruled on the
Motion to Reconsider. R. 156: 3-5. The court also asked, "We don't yet have a trial date in
this case though, do we?" R. 156: 5. In defendant's presence, defense counsel responded:
No. We do not, Your Honor. He is doing a year commitment at the
present time so we're not under, there isn't a, he's not filing a 120 day
disposition [request] . . .
R. 156: 5. The trial court scheduled another pretrial conference, at which time it would
determine, based on its ruling on the motion, whether a trial date needed to be set at that time.
R. 156: 5. The court initially suggested a setting for three weeks later, but due to a
scheduling conflict of defense counsel, settled on a date four weeks later. R. 156: 5.
At the next scheduled pretrial conference on October 27, 2000. the trial court asked
for further oral argument from counsel on defendant's motion to reconsider. R. 157: 3-4.
Following argument by the respective parties, the court denied the motion and scheduled a
trial for the next available date on the calendar—February 1 -2,2001. R. 157:15-19; see also
R. 77. Because defendant's court-appointed attorney would no longer be representing
defendant, the court set another pretrial conference in December. R. 157: 19. The pretrial
conference was held in December and another was set for January to resolve lingering issues
regarding a requested lineup. See R. 79-80, 158.
At the pretrial conference on January 10. 200 L defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming the State had failed to bring the case to trial within 120 days of his request for
disposition. R. 88-93; R. 159: 3-6; see also R. 97-98.

5

On January 30, 200L the court heard oral argument from the respective parties. R.
154. The trial court thereafter granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to set trial
within 120 days of the disposition demand. R. 99-104, 124-31, 136-40, 145-50, 154.2 The
State timely appealed. R. 141-42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The detainer period commenced on July 10, 2000—the date defendant delivered his
120-day disposition request to the jailer. That period was extended 42 days because of delay
occasioned by defendant's motion to suppress and another 49 days because of delay
occasioned by defendant's motion to reconsider. This extended the detainer period to
February 6, 2001—five days after the scheduled trial. The trial court therefore erred in
concluding that the 42-day delay occasioned by the motion to suppress did not toll the
detainer period. In any event, good cause existed for any delay extending beyond the
detainer period. Although defendant had delivered to the jailer a disposition request, defense
counsel represented that defendant was not filing a disposition request. The prosecutor's
reliance on counsel's representation was reasonable inasmuch as the disposition request was
not placed in the court file and a copy was never received by the prosecutor. In the
alternative, the trial court committed plain error in dismissing all four charges in the
information where defendant only identified one in his disposition request.

2

The trial court's Ruling, which detailed the reasons for granting the motion, was
entered after the Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See R. 137-40,
145-50. The Ruling is reproduced in Addendum A.
6

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST
DEFENDANT
On defendant's motion, the trial court below dismissed the charges against him,
concluding that the prosecution failed to bring the case to trial as required under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). R. 137-40. That dismissal is reversible error.
Section 77-29-1 provides:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison Jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment
of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous

7

motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). Like its predecessor, the purpose of section 77-29-1 is
"to protect the constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed
charges against him." See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404-05 (Utah 1982) (citing
purpose of predecessor statute); accord State v. Files, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985)
(citing purpose of section 77-29-1 in similar terms); see also State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,
362, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969) (citing purpose of predecessor statute).
The burden of complying with the statute rests with the prosecutor. State v. Heaton,
958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). Once a prisoner has delivered a disposition request, "the
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the statutory
period." Id. Thus, a defendant need not even object to a trial setting that falls outside the
required time period. Id; accord State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1991). Instead,
the prosecutor must "notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed," and he must
otherwise "make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915.
Determining whether charges were properly dismissed under section 77-29-1 requires
a two-step inquiry. Id. at 916. "First, [the Court] must determine when the 120-day period
commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial [fell] outside the 120-day period, [the
Court] must then determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Id. "[T]he trial
court's factual determinations will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." Peterson, 810

8

P.2d at 425. However, the court's "legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation
of the statute which grants the trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness." Id.
A.

THE DISPOSITION PERIOD HAD NOT EXPIRED BEFORE THE TRIAL DATE.

1. The Detainer Period Commenced on July 10, 2000.
As explained, the Court must first determine "when the 120-day period commenced
and when it expired." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. By the statute's plain terms, "the 120-day
period commences on the date written notice is 'delivered to the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same.'" Id, {quoting Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-1(1)). The trial court found that defendant delivered his disposition request to
Lieutenant Carter of the Utah County Jail on July 10, 2000. R. 149-50: f 4. The State does
not contest that finding.3 Based on that date, the trial court therefore correctly determined
that the 120-day disposition period commenced on July 10,2000. R. 147-48; see Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1(1); Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916.
2.

The Detainer Period Did Not Expire Until February 6,2001—5 Days
After the Trial Setting.

The 120th day after July 10, 2000 was November 7, 2000. R. 147: f 5. However,
determining when the disposition period expired is not as simple as counting 120 days from
the date the detainer period commenced. Any period of delay created by defendant during
3

Although the disposition request was apparently signed by defendant on July 10,
2000, nothing on the face of the document indicates when it was delivered to Lt. Carter.
See R. 90. Clearly, however, the request was delivered no later than July 12, 2000—the
date Lt. Carter appears to have forwarded it to the Fourth District Court. See R. 89.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
The disposition request is reproduced in Addendum B.
9

that period tolls the running of the time for bringing the case to trial. See Heaton, 958 P.2d
at 916; accord State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Utah App. 1993). This
is because "when a prisoner himself acts to delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to
temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. Accordingly, the
"disposition period [is] extended by the amount of time during which defendant himself has
created delay." State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115,116 (Utah 1982); accord Heaton, 958 P.2d
at 916 (citing Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116).
Here, the proceedings were delayed 42 days because of defendant's motion to
suppress and another 49 days because of his motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of
the motion to suppress. See R. 17-18, 31-34, 40-41, 47-55, 57-58, 153: 33-36, 155-57.
These delays extended the detainer period from November 7, 2000 to February 6, 2001.
However, while the trial court correctly determined that the 49-day delay resulting from
defendant's motion to reconsider tolled the detainer period, it erred in concluding that the 42day delay resulting from defendant's motion to suppress did not. See R. 145-47: ^fl[ 5, 9.
On July 7, 2000, following the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, defendant
notified the court of his intention to file pretrial motions, presumably dispositive of the case.
See R. 153: 33-34. Accordingly, the trial court did not set trial, but instead established a
motion schedule, setting oral argument for August 21,2000. R. 153:35-36.4 OnAugust21,

4

Pursuant to the motion schedule, defendant had three weeks to file any motions,
the prosecutor had two weeks to file his responses, and defendant had another week to
reply. R. 153: 35-36. Oral argument was set three days after defendant's replies were
due. R. 153:36.
10

2000, after hearing oral argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence. R. 40. Defendant's decision to pursue a motion to suppress thus resulted in 42
days of delay, from July 10th to August 21st—the day the court denied defendant's motion.
The trial court did not extend the detainer period 42 days for the delay created by the
motion to suppress. R. 146-47: f 5. It reasoned that the detainer period is set at 120 days
"perhaps to accommodate foreseeable motions such as suppression motions and other
circumstances that often arise in bringing a case to trial." R. 145: ^j 9. That reasoning,
however, is inconsistent with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. Delays resulting from
pretrial motions brought by the defendant have been held to toll the 120-day detainer period.
See State v. Banner, 1\1 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) (tolling the time for motion to
dismiss and motion to exclude evidence of prior crimes). The high court has even attributed
to defendant delay occasioned by his request for a preliminary hearing. Heaton, 958 P.2d at
916. As such, it was error for the court not to extend the detainer period by the delay created
by defendant's motion to suppress.
The trial court recognized the propriety of not setting a trial date while the motion to
reconsider was pending "because if the court found that the evidence should be suppressed
the prosecution would most likely have had to dismiss the case." R. 146: ^f 5. The same
rationale applies with equal force to the motion to suppress. Courts can ill afford to schedule
trials where a motion is pending that might make a trial unnecessary. Failure of a court to
anticipate that possibility could result in empty calendars, unnecessarily delaying proceedings

11

in other cases. Accordingly, the foreseeable delay occasioned by a pretrial motion, such as
a motion to suppress, is reasonably charged to the defendant.
In sum, just as the court attributed to defendant the 49-day delay created by his motion
to reconsider, it also should have charged to defendant the 42-day delay created by his
motion to suppress. In pursuing the motion to suppress and motion to reconsider, defendant
"indicate[d] his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." See Heaton, 958
P.2d at 916. Therefore, as the graphic below demonstrates, the detainer period should have
been extended not by 49 days, but by 91 days, leaving the prosecution until February 6,2001
to bring the case to trial. Where trial was scheduled to begin February 1, 2001, the
prosecutor would have complied with the detainer statute but for the dismissal.
July 2000
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B.

GOOD CAUSE SUPPORTED ANY SETTING AFTER THE DISPOSITION PERIOD.

Assuming arguendo the detainer period had expired, good cause excused the delay.
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. Pursuant to subsection (4) of the detainer statute, failure of the
prosecutor to have the matter heard within the detainer period may be excused upon a
showing of good cause. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4); Peterson, 810 P.2d at 424. In this
case, defendant led the prosecution, as well as the court, to believe that no disposition request
had been filed. This misrepresentation was compounded by the court's apparent failure to
enter the request in the court file and the prosecutor's lack of any notice of a disposition
request.
At a pretrial conference on September 29, 2000, while defendant's motion to
reconsider was still pending, the trial court expressed concern that a trial date had not yet
been set:
Well, since the motion is pending I suppose I had better do a ruling on it. And
I would like to really consider it so that I, realizing that either side may have
a right to appeal I'd better make sure I've done what I need to do. So since
that's under advisement... We don't yet have a trial date in this case though,
do we?
R. 156: 4-5. As the Supreme Court in Heaton made clear, defendant had no duty at this
juncture to advise the court that he had filed a disposition request or to otherwise insist on
a timely trial setting. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. However, defendant did not simply remain
silent. Instead, counsel replied:
No. We do not, Your Honor. He is doing a year commitment at the
present time so we're not under, there isn't a, he's not filing a 120 day
disposition [demand] . . .
13

R. 156: 5 (emphasis added). In making that representation to the court, defendant effectively
abandoned any prior disposition request. Counsel's remarks certainly led both the court and
prosecutor into a false sense of security regarding the necessity of obtaining a quick trial
setting.
Defendant reinforced that belief at the October 27th pretrial conference. Initially,
defense counsel told the trial court that although defendant was currently serving a one-year
commitment on another case, defendant "want[ed] to get these [charges] cleared up . . . as
quickly as possible." R. 157: 18; see also R. 157: 19 (stating that defendant "would
obviously prefer something sooner," but remarking, "But, you know, if you can't do it, you
can't do it"). Later, however, when discussing a lineup order, counsel represented:
We have plenty of time. We don't want to disturb the trial date or
anything. [Judge indicates "Okay."] We already think its too far off. And if
it came right down to it we wouldn't, you know, we're not going to make a big
deal out of it (short inaudible, no mic) three months makes a big deal out of it.
R. 157: 26. Defendant thus reinforced its prior representation that he was not insisting on
a trial within 120 days.
The prosecutor's implicit reliance on these representations was reasonable because
he had no notice of the disposition request. He had not received a copy of the request from
the jailer as required by statute. See R. 159: 3-4; Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2). Moreover,
the court never placed the disposition request in the court file. R. 147: ^ 4 & n.3.5 Even had

5

The request for disposition delivered to the court by the jailer still does not appear
in the court file. The only copy of the request appearing in the record is that which is
attached to defendant's motion to dismiss. See R. 88-93.
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the prosecutor received notice of the prior request, defense counsel's representation was
tantamount to an abandonment of his speedy trial demand.
This case is not like Heaton where the case "fell through a crack in the prosecutor's
office." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. There, trial was delayed by at least 60 days because the
court clerk had failed to reassign the case after the original judge recused himself. Id. at 913,
915. The "administrative glitch" by the court did not constitute good cause because implicit
in the prosecutor's duty to have the matter heard within the statutory period "is the duty to
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply
with the statute." Id. at 916. Although the prosecutor had notice of the request, he did
nothing to bring the matter to trial in a timely manner. Id. at 915-16. Here, however, the
prosecutor never had that opportunity because he did not receive a copy of the notice, nor did
the court provide constructive notice by entering its copy in the file. Indeed, the reason
remains unclear why the request was never placed in the court file, though perhaps
defendant's misidentification of the case number had something to do with that.6 The
prosecutor had no way of knowing that he had any such duty. Moreover, defense counsel
represented that they were not filing a disposition request. Accordingly, any delay extending
beyond the detainer period was excused for good cause.

6

The district court number was 001402283, but defendant identified it as case
number 001400283. See R. 90.
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II.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
DISMISSING THREE CHARGES WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN
DEFENDANT'S DISPOSITION REQUEST
Should this Court determine that the trial court properly calculated the disposition
period and properly rejected the prosecutor's good cause claim, it should nevertheless
examine the scope of the dismissal order. The trial court committed plain error in dismissing
all four of the charges pending against defendant based on violation of section 77-29-1.
Defendant invoked the statute only as to the methamphetamine charge. He did not invoke
the statute as to the remaining three charges. Accordingly, the State should be free to pursue
them against defendant.
Because the prosecutor failed to raise this issue below, it is reviewed on appeal for
plain error. To establish plain error, the State must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, f20, 5 P.3d 642.
Section 77-29-1 details the steps defendant must take to properly invoke the statute:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.

16

(4) In the event the charze is not brought to trial within 120 days, or
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (emphasis added).
The plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires that in order for a
defendant's written disposition request to be effective, it must expressly include: (1) the
nature of the charge; (2) the court in which the charge is pending; and (3) a request for
disposition "of the pending charge..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). Defendant submitted
a written disposition notice, but it only identified the "Poss of Meth" charge, which
reasonably refers to count I in the information charging defendant with possession or use of
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. See R. 1-2, 90. However, defendant was also
charged with failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license.

R. 1-2.

Defendant's failure to even mention the remaining three charges in his disposition request
prevents application of section 77-29-1 to those charges. See, e.g., Aranza v. State, 444
S.E.2d 349,350 (Ga. App. 1994) (defendant's demand, which failed to identify the charges
upon which he demanded a speedy trial by name, date, term of court, or case number "cannot
reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of a defendant's
intention to invoke the extreme sanction" of dismissal; hence the time never commenced).
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The only description of the nature of the charges defendant sought to include in his
written disposition request is the phrase uPoss of Meth." That phrase does nothing to identify
the remaining charges, let alone impart the nature of those charges, and it gives no notice of
defendant's desire to have the remaining charges promptly disposed of. Those charges were
viable independent of the State's ability to prove unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. The simple fact that all the offenses were discovered at the same time and
charged in the same information does not relieve defendant of his burden of identifying the
nature of each pending charge in order to impose upon the State the burden of complying
with the speedy trial statute. Neither is defendant relieved of that burden by the presumption
that the prosecutor knew of the existence of the charges. Cf. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447,
451 (Utah 1987) (letter from defense counsel to the county attorney inquiring about
prosecution of defendant did not trigger section 77-29-1 because, among other things, the
letter did not "specify the charges, as required by section 77-29-1(1)."); Viles, 702 P.2d at
1176 (a notice of appearance filed by defendant's counsel, including a plea of "not guilty"
and a request that defendant be granted a trial upon the charge, was not sufficient to meet the
requirements for invoking section 77-29-1 because, among other things, it "did not specify
the nature of the charge").
Because prosecution of the State's case lies in the balance under this statute, strict
compliance by defendant with the minimal requirements to trigger the statute should be
required. Defendant need only provide a minimum of readily-available information in
writing to his custodial authorities, who then are responsible for adding additional
18

information and actual delivery of the disposition request to the appropriate entities. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16; Wright, 745 P.2d at 450-51; Viles, 702
P.2d at 1175. Charges must be pending before defendant may invoke the statute, making it
easy for the defendant to identify the nature of the pending charges and the court having
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). There is no need for any entity involved in the
prosecution or management of the case to have to guess as to the scope of the disposition
request.
In this case, defendant submitted his written disposition request after the charges were
filed and after he had been appointed counsel. He was in the best position possible to
determine and include in his disposition request all the charges he intended to submit to this
expedited process. It is not unduly burdensome to require under these circumstances that
proper invocation include, at a minimum, identifying each pending charge defendant intends
the disposition request to cover, especially as the penalty for the State's failure to act
promptly under the statute is extreme-dismissal with prejudice of all identified pending
charges.
Because the disposition request fails to name three of the four charges pending against
defendant, let alone identify the nature of those charges, the statute was not properly invoked
as to those charges. The error in dismissing the three charges was obvious given the express
language of both the statute and the disposition request, and it was prejudicial in that it
prevented further prosecution of all three unnamed charges. Accordingly, dismissal of those
three charges should be reversed and proceedings allowed to continue as to them.
19

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial
court's order dismissing the charges against defendant, or alternatively, to affirm only the
dismissal of count I charging unlawful possession of controlled substances in a drug-free
zone.
Respectfully submitted this Z ^ day of July, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

iY S. GRAY
JSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellant
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Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 001402283
vs.
DATE: March 19,2001
DANIAL JOHN PETERSON,
JUDGE: GUY R. BURNINGHAM

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon the
State's failure to bring the case to trial within 120 days of the defendant filing a demand for
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. On June 2, 2000, the defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance
in a drug free zone, failure to stop at the command of a police officer, possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, and driving on a suspended or revoked drivers licence.
2. On June 13, 2000, bail was set at $2500.00 cash or bond.
3. On July 7, a preliminary hearing was held and the defendant was bound over on all
charges. The defendant entered not guilty pleas to all counts. Counsel for defendant indicated
that he would befilinga motion to suppress, the Court scheduled oral arguments on the motion
for August 21, 2000.
4. On July 10, 2000,1 Lieutenant Scott Carter of the Utah County Jail, received a 120

*It is unclearfromthe documents provided to the court whether Lt. Carter received the
written notice on July 10, 2000. It is clear however that the defendant sent the written notice as
required on July 10, 2000. It is also clear that Lt. Carter received notice on or before July 12,
2000, because on this date he forwarded the demand to the Fourth District Court. This
explanation is for clarity only because whether the 120-day period commenced on July 10th or
1
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day disposition request from the defendant, Danial Peterson, as required under Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-1. On July 12, 2000, Lt. Carter sent a copy of the request to the Fourth District Court.
5. On August 21, 2000, the Court heard arguments on the defendant's motion to
suppress. The Court denied the motion, and a pretrial conference was scheduled for September 8,
2000.
6. On September 6, 2000, upon request by the defendant and stipulation from the State,
an Order was signed by the Court ordering a criminal identification lineup.
7. On September 8, 2000, the date for the pretrial conference, with defendant present,
counsel for defendant filed a Motion to reconsider denial of the previous motion to suppress,
which the court agreed to take under advisement. The pretrial conference was continued due to
the new motion to reconsider.
8. On September 29, 2000, the parties returned for a pretrial conference. The motion
had not been ruled upon, so the pretrial conference was continued until October 27, 2000.
9. On October 27, 2000, the Motion to Reconsider was denied. Trial was scheduled for
February 1st and 2nd 2001.
10. On January 10, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
11. On January 12, Mr. Peterson filed an amended motion to dismiss.
12. On January 16, 2001, the State filed a memorandum in opposition of the motion to
dismiss.
13. On January 25, 2001, the defendant filed a response to the State's opposition of the
motion to dismiss.
14. On January 30, 2001, oral arguments were heard by the Court.
The Court, having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon
being advised in the premises, now issues the following:
RULING
1. The Utah detainer statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or

July 12th 2000 is irrelevant to the motion, as the two days did not materially impact the length of
the delay in this case.
2
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other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent
of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall
be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery
of written notice.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the courtfindsthat the failure of the
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4).
2. Deciding whether to grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute
requires a two-step inquiry. First, it must be determined when the 120-day period commenced and
when it expired. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). "Second, if the trial was held
outside the 120-day period, we must then determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Id.
3. The Utah detainer statute clearly provides that a prisoner is entitled to have charges
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice to the "warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). The 120-day period begins the date
that this notice is received by the appropriate authority. Id; see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916.
The lieutenant at the Utah County Jail received Mr. Peterson's notice on July 10, 2000, thus
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initiating the 120-day period.2
4. The statute also requires that the warden send notice to the "appropriate prosecuting
attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2). The Fourth District Court received a
copy of the disposition by certified mail.3 There is no evidence however, that the Utah County
Attorney's Office received notice of the demand. The fact that the prosecuting attorney did or did
not receive notice is immaterial as to the initiation of the 120-day period. The responsibility of the
defendant is to deliver "a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-291(1). Once this requirement is satisfied, the defendant has met his requirement under the statute
and the burden falls upon the prosecution.4 The fact that the warden or lieutenant did not deliver
the demand or that the demand was lost at the receiving end cannot be attributed to or counted
against the defendant.
5. The 120-day period commenced on July 10, 2000; with no delays, the 120-day
period would have expired on November 7,2001. The disposition period, however, is extended
the amount of time that the prisoner himself acts to delay the trial. See State v. Velasquez, 641
P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). Peterson did cause a delay in the trial date scheduling. The defendant
indicated at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing that he would befilinga motion to suppress.
This motion was heard by the Court on August 21,2000, at which time the motion was denied.
The parties returned on September 8, 2000 for a pretrial conference to schedule a trial date.
During this appearance, the defense filed a motion to reconsider the previous denial of the motion
to suppress. The Court agreed, with no objection from the state, to consider the motion,
2

See footnote 1.

3

The certified mail receipt to the court was signed but by some error never made it to the
file, therefore the Court did not have notice of the disposition. The State is not responsible for the
administrative mistakes of the court but the burden of bringing the charges to trial within the 120day period does not fall on the court, this burden lies solely upon the prosecution. See Heaton,
958P.2dat915.
4

"When a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the statutory
period." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915.
4

therefore, the pretrial conference was continued and no trial date was set because if the court
found that the evidence should be suppressed the prosecution would most likely have had to
dismiss the case. The 49 days between September 8, 2000 and October 27, 2000, when the
motion to reconsider was denied and a trial date was set, cannot be counted as part of the 120day disposition period.
Excluding the 49-day delay attributable to Peterson, the State had until December 26,
2000, to bring Peterson to trial, this did not happen.
6. The second step is to determine whether "good cause" excused the delay under § 7729-1(4). The original trial date was set at a pretrial conference on October 27, 2000 for February
1, and 2, 2001. There were no other dates suggested although counsel for Peterson stated that he
would prefer an earlier date. There were no scheduling conflicts between counsel. There was no
continuance motioned for or granted. On October 27, 2000, the Court set another pretrial
conference for December 8, 2000, which was continued, but this did not affect the trial date
scheduled for February 1 and 2, 2001.
7. The burden to bring the case to trial is not on the defendant. Although he did not
state that he had a 120-day disposition pending during scheduling of the trial, there is no
indication in the statute that the defendant has any duty beyond giving the written notice to the
proper authorities in the jail or prison. See State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah
1991)(holding that defendant did not have to object to trial date in order to maintain his rights
under the statute).
8. The first trial date set was for February 1 and 2, 2001. This date clearly falls outside
of the 120-day period even accounting for defendant's delays. This case is distinguishable from
Heaton. In Heaton there was a trial date set within the 120 day period, shortly before trial the
defendant requested a preliminary hearing, which he had previously waived. The trial court then
tried to accommodate a trial on the last day before the 120-day period expired but defense
counsel was not available on that date. The Heaton court held that "extending the trial date to a
reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's
schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
No such scheduling conflict arose in this case. The trial was set for February 1 and 2, 2001 and it
5
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was maintained. Defense counsel changed from the date of scheduling but the trial date remained.
9. The 120-day period was established, adding 30 days from the previous statutory 90day detainer period, perhaps to accommodate foreseeable motions such as suppression motions
and other circumstances that often arise in bringing a case to trial. The trial date, however, was
never set within the 120-day period.
10. Section 77-29-1(3) allows the court to grant reasonable continuances upon
showing of good cause. There were no continuances granted or requested. The fact that the
prosecution did not receive notice could possibly be seen as good cause, but the fact that the
prosecution has an affirmative duty suggests that inaction and/or ignorance is not enough for a
showing of good cause for failure to have the matter heard within the time required. The failure
of the proper authorities at the jail to deliver the disposition or loss upon receipt cannot prejudice
the defendant's right to have his case brought to trial within the requisite time. The defendant
cannot be required to bear the burden of the proper jail authorities in delivering the demand, nor
the burden of the prosecution in bringing the case to trial within the 120-day period. The
opportunity for abuse is evident if this were required.
Therefore, the failure to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported
by good cause. The defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, with prejudice.

Dated this / ? day of March, 2001.

Guy R. Burningh:
Fourth District Co

cc: Jared Eldridge
David Wayment
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Jan-09-01

02:28P UT r^unty Jail

8013434209

P

Utah County Sheriff
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF

Nntice of 120 DAY DISPOSITION

TO: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
FROM: LT. SCOTT CARTER - UTAH COUNTY MIL
DATE: July 12, 2000
RE: 120 DAY DISPOSITION FOR Danial Peterson
Enclosed is a copy of a request for a 120 Day Disposition T received from one of our inmates,
Danial Peterson. Mr. Peterson claims to have an outstanding information in your court.
Case #001400283.

STREET ADDRESS: 3075 N. Main, Spanish Fork, UT84660
MAQJNC ADDRESS: P.O. Sox 1547, Provo, UT84603

PHONE (801) 343-4000

PAX: (801) 3434019

Jan-09-01

02:28P

UT

County

Jail

8013434209

P . 02

ENTER INMATE REQUEST AND GRIEVANCE FORM

k*_\}$0&_

UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY JAIL
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION
OF PENDING CHARGES

TO: JAIL COMMANDER, UTAH COUNTY JAIL
Notice is hereby given that I , f)AjJl/} I fglPfSpK
do hereby
request final disposition
of any charges now pending against me in
any court in the State of Utah. Charge(s) are now pending
against
me in the court(s)
listed
below:
fc^gS^
pending in £ ^ f > V £ ^
pending in
h

/'

^__ pending in
•

,1

i

4

WV

'

' '

/"
' " '

*-*

^ / C r t T ^

'*

(

(List any additional charges and courts on the back of (his form.)

/^

Request
is hereby made that
you forward
this
notice
to the
appropriate
authorities
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7 7-29-1,
et. seq. together
with such information as required by law.
Dated this

ft?

day of ^5tt

[/

Inmate's

, i-J3

^lj7^^

signature

9o

Utah County Sheriff
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF

Notice of 120 DAY DISPOSITION

TO: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
FROM: LT. SCOTT CARTER - UTAH COUNTY JAIL
DATE: July 12,2000
RE: 120 DAY DISPOSITION FOR Danial Peterson
Enclosed is a copy of a request for a 120 Day Disposition I received from one of our inmates,
Danial Peterson. Mr. Peterson claims to have an outstanding information in your court.
CaseJ001400283.
SENBERT;
•Comptotftittmtl
•Complete itan*'
•Print your rami
cardtoyou.
•Attach t i l form
pannft.
*VM*'R*umR4
•ThaRatumf
oaffvarad.

9661 l.udv '008C "
6. Signature: (nuutmaw

m^ymH/

/

y

^ Sd

,

£
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , December! 9 9 * * ^

102595.97^0179

Domestic Return Receipt

STREET ADDRESS: 3075 N. Main, Spanish Fork, UT 84660
MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. Box 1547, Prouo, UT84603

PHONE: (801)
*

3434000

FAX: (801) 343-4019

UTAH COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT
Correctional Division
Inmate Request and Grievance Form

Inmate Name
Date

SDIC

Cell B^ock

7-4Q

Check One:
i -

[ ] Good Time
( ) Cell Change

[ ] Grievance
( ] Appeal

>c) Other (specify)

/_?,/"

[ ] Legal Material
( ] Medical
,

/O*?^

J/.rA/'v'^

Request

Jrc,r nrai^-^^^tu^i^^^^^£_

^ /J

3^*=£Ui07^y''tfsr<7

•j^r\

/
/

'•y

/"

//
. <

Do not write below this line.
Received by CLK
Routed to:

Answer :

For official use only
Date

[ ] Jail Commander
[ ) Other (specify)

( ) Admirustra>tion
J ~f^ t ^ L
^

T/ZW
[ ] Classificati on

We completed and mailed your 120 Day DispesitionSig

Disposition by:

Lt Carter

Returned to Inmate by:

Original - Inmate file;

Date
Date.

7-12-00

Time

ffS7

[ ] Medical

Today.

Time

133Chr3.

Time

Yellow - Inmate
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